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Pathways Toward Reconciliation
A Comparative Analysis

I.

INTRODUCTION
Human rights violations have commanded markedly different responses from

international organizations, nations and affected communities. Although divergent in
structure, jurisdiction and procedure, each systemic response shares a common goal national reconciliation and social reconstruction. This paper primarily focuses on a
more traditional system, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), in an
effort to compare and distinguish its reconciliatory impact with alternative systems
employed by the Rwandese government, its localities and South Africa post apartheid.
In order to assess the likely impact of alternative systems on a nation of genocide
survivors, one must first understand the historical precursors - the origin, enormity and
longevity of tensions that gave rise to the tragedy itself. With that in mind, this paper
provides a brief history of events leading up to the 1994 Rwandese genocide. It then
presents an overview of the ICTR's formation and the criticisms that ensued and
concludes with an exploration of the alternatives.

II.

A HISTORY OF ETHNIC TENSION
a. The Precursors
The Hutu-Tutsi power struggle began long ago in 1860 when Tutsi invaders

conquered the Hutu in Rwanda. 1 From that point on, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict was never
about achieving racial equality. It was, however, about domination.
In the beginning, the Tutsi subjugated the Hutu in every context - militarily,
politically and economically. The Tutsi were born into a rigid class structure and raised

1

PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE UN
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 3 (Ashgate 2002)(1994).

1

within an ideology of Tutsi superiority. 2 This was most evident under the Rwandese
penal system which allowed Tutsi to escape with impunity for crimes that would have
required a death sentence for the Hutu. 3
Following World War I (WWI), Belgium ruled Rwanda as an administrative
trusteeship under the League of Nations mandate system. 4 From the outset, Belgian
administrators perpetuated Tutsi superiority by demonstrating great favoritism of the
Tutsi. For example, the Belgians instituted a system of forced labor wherein the Tutsis
were assigned as taskmasters of the Hutu. 5 Also, Belgian administrators excluded Hutu
from certain government employment and opportunities for higher education. 6 After
World War II (WWII), however, certain events turned the tides of Belgian sentiment in
favor of the Hutu. A flood of Flemish missionaries entered Rwanda in the l 950's,
identified with the Hutu, 7 and supported their political ambitions. 8 At the same time,
Belgian administrators realized that with a Rwandese population of 80% Hutu, a post
independence power struggle was inevitable. 9 Reluctant to usher into independence an
unstable government, the Belgian colonial powers crafted a democratic revolution.
Between 1960 and Rwandese independence on July 1, 1962, colonial administrators
replaced Tutsi chiefs with Hutu, marshaled in 229 new mayors (only 19 of which were
2

Id . at 5.

3

Id • at 7.

4

ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 34-35 (Human Rights Watch 1999)(from
1894 until the end of WWI, Rwanda was under the control of German East Africa).

5

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 11.

6

DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 35.

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 12 (historically in Belgium, the Francophone Walloon minority had
dominated the Flemish majority).

7

8

Id

9

Id

2

Tutsi) and facilitated the election of President Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu. 10 Armed
with their newfound power and eager for retribution, Hutu leaders instigated a
campaign of persecution against the Tutsi, a period known as the "Hutu Revolution."

11

By 1967, over 300,000 Tutsi had fled the country in fear and more than 20,000 had been
slaughtered, 12 most in retaliation for Tutsi refugee invasions. 13
In July 1973, the Hutu-led Rwandese government was overthrown in a coup

d’etat led by Major Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu. 14 Over the next two decades,
Habyarimana ruled by dictatorship through a single party, the Mouvement

Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement (MRND). 15 Throughout his
administration, Habyarimana encouraged the eradication of the Tutsi, Hutu opposition,
and virtually anyone thought to be affiliated with the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a
group of exiled Rwandese stationed in Uganda. 16 Habyarimana eventually allowed a
multiparty system within Rwanda in 1990 that resulted in the formation of a new party
called the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR). 17 The CDR, however,

10

Id

11

DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 39.

12

Id . at 40

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 14. The Tutsi population in 1991 measured approximately half (8.4%)
of what it had been in 1952 (17.5%). DES FORGES, supra note 5, at 40.
13
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MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 15.

15

Id

16

In 1990-92, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Rwandese refugees (Hutu and Tutsi)
from Uganda, commenced a failed invasion of Rwanda. In response, Hutu nationalists killed nearly
2000 Tutsi for alleged RPF affiliation. Valarie Percival, Environmental Scarcity and the Violent
Conflict (1995), 1 4, available at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/rwanda/rwandal.htm (last
visited March 20, 2005).
17

DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 52-53.
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was critical of the MNRD for its concessions to the RPF and merely served to intensify
Tutsi oppression. 18
Habyarimana and the RPF signed the Arusha Accords, a cease fire agreement, on
August 3, 1993, calling for a power-sharing government, repatriation of R wandese
refugees and the integration of Tutsi into the armed forces. 19 The Arusha Accords,
however, were not well received by Habyarimana's pro-Hutu constituency.
Consequently, anti-Tutsi and anti-Accord propaganda in Rwanda escalated. Then, a
Tutsi-led coup d’etat against neighboring Burundi's Hutu president on October 1, 1993
precipitated additional violence against the Hutu in Rwanda. 20 With a flood of
Burundian-Hutu refugees at his doorstep, Habyarimana reneged on the Arusha
agreement. 21
In the latter half of 1993, the MNRD and CDR collectively recruited and trained
youth militias, or death squads, known as the Interahamwe (those who attack together)
and Impuzamugambi (those with a single purpose) to seek out and destroy prominent
Tutsi opponents and Hutu sympathizers. 22 Meanwhile, Habyarimana was being cast as
a "Tutsi-loving RPF accomplice" due to renewed negotiations over Arusha Accord
compliance. 23 On April 6, 1994, during his return from Accord negotiations,

18

19

Id .at53.
MAGNARELLA,

20

Id . at 17-18.

21

Id • at 18.

supra note 1, at 16-17.

22

Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 199 (Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998)
[hereinafter Akayesu ] .

23

MAGNARELLA,

supra note 1, at 19.
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Habyarima's presidential plane was destroyed by a Rwandese missile. 24 His death
unleashed the tension that had been building within Rwanda for more than a century.
b. The Genocide: "Our enemy is one, we know him, it is the Tutsi." 25
Within hours of the Habyarimana's death, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi
had constructed road blocks in the capital city of Kigali and proceeded to kill Tutsi,
opposition parties, and human rights activists with machetes and iron bars. 26 Lists of
Hutu opponents, compiled months before by Habyarimana' s presidential entourage,
guided Hutus in their campaign. 27 Tutsis were raped, dismembered, and burned alive
and fetus of mixed blood were destroyed. 28 The perpetrators, however, were not only
members of the CDR and MNRD; the civilian Hutu population was also complicit in the
killing:
With the encouragement of [radio] messages and leaders at every level of
society, the slaughter of Tutsis and the assassination of Hutu
oppositionists spread from region to region. Following the militias'
example, Hutus young and old rose to the task. Neighbors hacked
neighbors to death in their homes, and colleagues hacked colleagues to
Doctors killed their patients, and
death in their workplaces.
schoolteachers killed their pupils. Within days, the Tutsi populations of
many villages were all but eliminated .... 29
After three months of fighting their way down into the capital of Kigali,
the RPF defeated their Hutu opposition and declared a unilateral cease-fire on

24

DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 181.

25

Id • at 203 (lyrics sung by perpetrators on the streets of Kigali).

26

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 19.

27

Id

28

Id.

29

PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH To INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES 114-15 (New York, Farrar Straus and Giroux 1998).

5

July 18, 1994.

30

By that time, however, eleven percent of the total Rwandese

population, including 800,000 Tutsi and between 20,000 and 30,000 Hutu had
been murdered. 31 The RPF pledged to abide by the power sharing and
integration protocols of the Arusha Accords. 32 The new government had the
support of the UN Security Council, which sanctioned the Arusha Peace Accords
as the "appropriate framework for reconciliation. " 33
III.

THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

Rwandese and the international community called out for punitive
measures to be taken against all perpetrators of the genocide. The general
consensus, however, was that Rwanda lacked the necessary politica1 34 and
financial resources to reach persons who had escaped across its borders.
Moreover, the UN feared that an RPF-led prosecutorial initiative would instigate
more internal reprisals. Therefore, on November 8, 1994, the UN SecretaryGeneral submitted Resolution 955 to the Security Council, calling for the
formation of the ICTR. 35 The Security Council was "convinced" that

30

MAGNARELLA,

supra note 1, at 21.

31

Id

32

Id . at 22.

33

Id • at 23 (citing UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/42).

34

For example, Rwanda did not have an extensive network of extradition treaties with which it could
compel the return of perpetrators whom had fled into neighboring countries.
UN Doc. S/Res/955, 11, 1994 [hereinafter Res. 955 "]. The Security Council could establish an
international court more quickly than one which might be created by treaty. Under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council can determine when threats to the peace exist and
determine what military or nonmilitary measures to take to ensure international peace and security. UN
Charter, signed June 26, 1945, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, Art. 39, 41, and 42, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (1969)[herinafter" U.N. Charter "]. More importantly, UN member states are
obligated to support those measures. Id . at Art. 42.
35

6

prosecutions in an international criminal court would "contribute to the process
of national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace. " 36
Resolution 955 passed a UN Security Council vote with one dissent Rwanda. 37 Rwanda objected on various grounds, including: (1) the ICTR statute
did not provide for capital punishment; (2) the statute's temporal jurisdiction did
not extend back to 1990, when hostilities began; (3) the Tribunal was based
outside Rwanda, in Arusha, Tanzania; (4) the Tribunal would have primacy over
Rwandese courts; and (5) Rwandese judges were prohibited from sitting on the
Tribunal. 38 Under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
however, the Rwandese government is not without independent recourse. 39
Rwanda has been granted concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction. This
jurisdiction, however, is limited. For example, Rwanda must defer to the
Tribunal upon request. 40 In addition, the ICTR may retry national court cases if

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 42; Res. 955, supra note 35, preamble ("Convinced that in the
particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law would enable this aim [bringing justice to the perpetrators] to be
achieved and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration of
maintenance and peace ... ").
36

See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics
of Punishment , 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 508 (1996); see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL
COURTS AND NATIONAL TRIALS 3-4 (July 1997).
37

Victor Peskin, International Justice and Domestic Rebuilding: An Analysis of the Role for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda , J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (May 20, 2000), available
at http://www.jha.ac/greatlakes/b003.htm (last visited April 7, 2005).
38

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR Statute ], in Res. 955,
supra note 35, annex.
39

40

Id . Art. 8(1-2).
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the acts at issue are mischaracterized as ordinary crimes, 41 not diligently
prosecuted, or proceedings are carried out in a non-impartial manner. 42
By June, 1995, the ICTR had pooled a tremendous amount of international
resources and had four-hundred suspects under investigation. 43 Obtaining
international cooperation with the extradition of persons indicted by the ICTR
was initially difficult, particularly with allied African states of the former
Habyarimana government. 44 Those states, however, eventually acquiesced upon
threat of sanction by the UN Security Council. 45 It was the successful
apprehension and ultimate prosecution of several principle actors that improved
political relations between the Tribunal and Rwanda. 46

IV.

THE ICTR - A CRITIQUE

Almost ten years after the Tribunal commenced operations and less than
six years from its estimated close, 47 the ICTR has endured a large number of
criticisms. Opponents accuse the Tribunal of being overly focused on the "law"
of genocide rather than the "survivors" of it, having little impact on Rwandese
lives, and being a waste of resources. These criticisms, along with those of the
author, are set forth below:
41

E.g. , "murder" in lieu of "genocide."

42

ICTR Statute, supra note 39, Art. 9.

43

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 50.

44

Id . at 51.

45

Id .(African states could not afford the sanction of a moratorium on economic aid).

46

MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 64-66.

Gabriele Kirk McDonald, Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal For the
Former Yugoslavia in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? PROCEEDINGS
'
OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW 22 (Steven R.
Ratner and James L.Bischoff, Eds. Nov. 2003).
47
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a. The ICTR Is Only Concerned With The Development of
International Jurisprudence. Not the Reconciliation Of Rwanda
The ICTR is criticized for simplistically viewing itself as a funnel for the
development of international criminal law. Indeed, the ICTR handed down the
first-ever judgment on the crime of genocide by an international court, 48 and thus
is seen, from the inside and out, as a groundbreaking legal institution. 49 While
praising the Tribunal's contributions to international jurisprudence, legal critics
and the Rwandese government argue that more focus should be given to the
impact that ICTR trials are having on genocide survivors and social
reconstruction. 50 Upon doing so, the Tribunal would inevitably have to account
for its actual contributions to reconciliation.

b. The ICTR Has No Impact On The Lives Of Rwandese
The Rwandese government claims that the majority of genocide survivors
are barely cognizant of the ICTR's existence, let alone its purpose. 51 Findings in
a survey of 2,091 Rwandese within four communes, conducted by the Human
Rights Center at the University of California, Berkley in 2002 ("Berkley

48

Akayesu, supra note 22, at Section 8, Verdict.

Message from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, available at
http://www.ictr.org/default.htm (last visited March 15, 2005)(Kofi Annan highlights the first-ever
genocide judgment in Akayesu as one that will contribute to national reconciliation).

49

Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda , 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
371 (1999); MARTHA MINNOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 25-51 (1998); Timothy Longman, The Domestic Impact of the
International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda , in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A
DIFFERENCE? PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
SCHOOL OF LAW 34 (Steven R. Ratner and James L.Bischoff, Eds. Nov. 2003).
50

Key Rwandese Genocide Trial Begins, 1 (BBC news online, Nov. 6, 2003), at http:/news.bbc.co.uk
(last visited Nov. 6, 2003)(quoting the Rwanda's Attorney General, Gerard Gahima, as saying, "[i]t [the
ICTR] has no impact in our country. Few people know about it, let alone care.").
51

9

survey"), lend support to these claims. 52 Of those polled, .7% of respondents
claimed to be well informed about the Tribunal and 10.5% said that they were
informed. 55.9%, however, claimed to be not well informed and 31.3% claimed
to be not at all informed. 53
The Rwandese population's lack of affiliation with the ICTR has been a
growing concern to the Tribunal and the international legal community. Most
recognize that in order for the ICTR to contribute to reconciliation in Rwanda,
Rwandese must know, understand, and appreciate the work of the Tribunal. 54
Indeed, the Berkley survey revealed that only 29.5% of respondents felt that the
ICTR would make a significant or very significant contribution to
reconciliation. 55 Contrast this figure with the 74.1 % of respondents whom felt
that the domestic genocide trials would make a significant or very significant
contribution to reconciliation. 56
Part of the disconnect between genocide survivors and the work of the
ICTR can be attributed to the location of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania,
beyond the sight or sound of most Rwandese. In the Berkley survey, 67.5% of
Rwandese agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "The International

See generally Timonthy Longman et al., Connecting justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward
Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda , in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: REBUILDING
COMMUNITIES IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING 208 (Harvey Weinstein & Eric
Stover eds. 2004).
52

53

Id

See , e.g. , Kelly Askin, International Criminal Tribunals and Victim-Witnesses , in INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW 49-50 (Steven R. Ratner and James L.Bischoff, Eds. Nov.
54

2003).
55

Longman et al., supra note 52, at 208.

56

Id

10

Criminal Trials should be held in Rwanda rather than Arusha," and only 19 .1 %
disagreed. 57 Relocation of the Tribunal at the brink of its close is not an option.
In recognition of the problem, however, the ICTR has implemented an Outreach
Program through which a range of techniques are being used to explain the
Tribunal's work and its significance to Rwanda. 58
The focal point of this effort is the Information Center in the capital city
of Kigali that has been operational since 2000. The center's mission is to
increase the public's understanding of the Tribunal through hardcopy
documentation, briefings and films. 59 The Outreach Program also supports daily
broadcasts from Arusha to the provinces by Rwandese journalists and provides
for the live broadcast of all judgments through Radio Rwanda. 60 These measures
are merely a sampling of the Tribunal's outreach initiative. The most effective
outreach programs, some claim, are not being instituted by the Tribunal but by
grassroots and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 61 For example, one
NGO films ICTR proceedings for later viewing by the Rwandese public and
detainees. 62 Viewer feedback and questions are presented to the Tribunal and the
Tribunal's responses are communicated back to the origin of the inquiry. 63 The

57

Id • at 209.

See generally , Outreach Programme for the ICTR, available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm (last
visited March 18, 2005).
58

59

Id .,r37.

60

Id .,r39.

61

Longman, supra note 50, at 46-47.

62

Id

63

Id
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Tribunal appears to be doing what it can to raise its credibility in the eyes of the
Rwandese people. The result of these efforts, however, remains to be seen.
c. The Tribunal Is Slow, A Waste Of Resources And Ineffective
Another criticism of the Tribunal is that it commands too many resources
for too little a result. 64 Between 1997 and January 2005, the ICTR issued
seventeen judgments involving twenty-three accused; currently, the Tribunal is
adjudicating eight cases involving another twenty-five defendants. 65 Under the
Tribunal's "completion strategy," no additional defendants will be identified
prior to the Tribunal's anticipated close in 2010. 66 Therefore, these 48
defendants represent the whole of those that will have been prosecuted by the
ICTR during its existence. These defendants are equivalent to .06% of the total
persons detained on suspicion of genocide inside Rwanda after hostilities ceased
in August, 1996. 67 Since operations commenced, the ICTR has expended an
operating budget of more than 567.81 million dollars. 68 If the budget for

64

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: A LAWYERS
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL COURTS AND NATIONAL TRIALS 3-4 (July 1997).
65

The Tribunal at a Glance, Status of Cases
visited March 20, 2005).
66

UN Doc. S/Res./1503,

,r,r 1, 6, 9, available at http://www.ictr.org/ default.htm (last

,r 7 (2003).

67

This figure is based on an estimate by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of
80,000 persons detained inside Rwandese prisons as of August 1996. MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at
71, cf. Id . at 80-81 (reporting an estimate by the Rwandese government of 125,000 prisoners as of
January 1999). Estimates varied, depending on the source and time period. United States Institute for
Peace, Special Report 13, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide, Trials Before
Rwandese Courts ,r 3 (1995)("Estimates of potential defendants in the trials before Rwandese courts
range from 20,000 to 100,000."), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwandal.html (last visited March 10, 2005).
Hirondelle News Agency: Arusha, Basic Facts on the ICTR, Section I, available at
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/O/d5df8df93c71 b8aac 1256e69004c22ce?OpenDocument (last
visited March 20, 2005)(figure includes operating budget from 1994 to 2003).
68
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retribution is the price tag of reconciliation, the question then is whether the
international community afford it.
While critics tout the ICTR as a waste of resources, it is not clear as to
whether Rwandese are as uniformly critical. In fact, 51.3% of Rwandeses in the
Berkley survey disagreed with the statement "The Arusha Tribunal has been a
waste of money," but only 27.1% agreed. 69 So, even though a large majority of
Rwandese know very little about the Tribunal and do not think it will make a
very significant contribution to reconciliation within Rwanda, 70 a slight majority
do not believe it to be a fruitless institution. What could explain this apparent
inconsistency? Possibly, the Rwandese who were polled in the Berkley survey
did not completely understand the enormity of the Tribunal's budget. Then
again, maybe Rwandese value the Tribunal for some other purpose, other than its
ability to hold certain perpetrators accountable.
Some believe that the Tribunal exists only because it is a means through
which the international community can assuage their own guilt for failing to take
action against the genocide. 71 Some speculate that the world will continue to
send money to the Tribunal regardless of negative opinion polls and without any
real commitment to social reconstruction or victim impact. 72 Indeed, 61.3% of
Rwandese polled in the Berkley survey agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement "The Arusha Tribunal is there above all to hide the shame of
69

Longman et al., supra note 52, at 215.

70

See discussion supra IV(b).

E.g. , Helena Cobban, The Legacies of Collective Violence: The Rwandese Genocide and the limits of
Law , BOSTON REV., Apr.-May, 2002, at 4, available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html (last visited March 10, 2005).
71

72

Id
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foreigners." 73 The survey, however, did not reveal whether or not Rwandese
were troubled by this purpose. The author speculates that at least part of the
reason R wandese do not view the Tribunal as a complete waste of resources is
because it is recognized as a symbol of international accountability. In that
regard, although the ICTR might not make a significant contribution to national
reconciliation, its impact on international reconciliation might be more
profound.

d. The Finding Of Individual Guilt, Amidst Collective Culpability, Cannot
Alone Facilitate Reconciliation.
Like its domestic counterparts, the ICTR individualizes guilt. Unlike domestic
crime, however, the root cause of mass violence on the scale of genocide is complex: a
culmination of precursors occurring over long periods of time. It is clear that the
R wandese genocide was incited by political and military figureheads, but the civilian
masses were co-opted into the killing through a form of psychological warfare that
capitalized on long-standing ethnic tensions. These tensions were perpetuated by
Belgian colonial administrators after WWI and ignored by much of the international
community for over a century. 74 Even the United Nations, an organization dedicated to
the maintenance of international peace and security, 75 refused to intervene after their
own commander, Gen. Romeo Dallaire of Canada, made it known that mass-murder was
imminent. 76 Then, there were individuals, both Hutu and Tutsi, who sympathized, did

73

Longman, supra note 50, at 39.

74

See discussion supra Section II.

75

U.N. Charter, supra note 35, Art. 1(1).

Rabbi Shmuley Boteach, Rwanda & Bill Clinton’s Infamy 1 6 (Jan. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.shmuley.com/index.php?section=article&id=13 (last visited March 20, 2005). See also

76

14

not participate in the killing, but watched. Where does the culpability for genocide
reside, with its architects, actors, or enablers? If it exists with any combination of the
three, how can the ICTR's apprehension of a few architects, and even fewer actors, heal
a nation?
If the goal of national reconciliation requires collective accountability, there are

few legal pathways towards that end. The actions or inactions of international persons
that contributed to historical ethnic tensions within Rwanda 77 lack the requisite mens
rea to qualify as punishable offenses under the ICTR statute, 78 Genocide Convention, 79

or Rome Statute. 80 Moreover, those actions or inactions are beyond the temporal
jurisdiction of certain courts and tribunals. 81 Without a means through which to
achieve formal accountability from indirect actors, Rwandese might be satisfied with an
informal acknowledgment, or maybe even a symbolic gesture - such as the ICTR. 82 In
any event, it is evident that Rwandese blame the enablers, as well as the architects and
Samantha Powers, Bystanders to Genocide , ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept., 2001, at 15. Powers accounts
for the Clinton administration's actions and inactions throughout the genocide. She notes how the
Clinton administration refused to send additional American forces to reinforce the small UN presence
in Rwanda. Powers also notes that the Clinton administration refused to persuade other UN
governments to send peacekeepers, but rather, strongly encouraged Security Council members to
completely dismantle the peacekeeping force.
77

See discussion supra Section II (e.g. , Belgium administration post WWII).

ICTR Statute, supra note 39, Art. 2(2)(Genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy , in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group ... )(emphasis
supplied).

78

79

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948,
entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, Art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (" ... genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part ... ")(emphasis supplied).
80

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CO NF /183/9*, 1998, Art. 30
("Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge .")( emphasis supplied)[hereinafter Rome Statute ] .
E.g. , ICTR Statute, supra note 39, Art. 7 (limiting the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal to the year
1994).

81

See discussion supra Section IV(c)(noting that Rwandeses might view the ICTR as important for
more than its ability to hand out retributive justice).
82
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direct actors. This blame is implied in the fact that so many Rwandeses see the ICTR as
a form of penance for the passive complicity of the international community. 83
Although it is uncertain whether informal or symbolic recognition might further
reconciliation, it is unlikely that twenty-five judgments against forty-eight orchestrators
and actors will be alone sufficient.
V.

THE ICTR MOUNTS A DEFENSE

The forgoing criticisms demonstrate that the process of national reconciliation
might fail if it is outsourced to an international institution. This reality was
incorporated into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which provides
for the admissibility of claims only if a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute
(complementary jurisdiction). 84 In its defense, however, the ICTR never claimed to be
a panacea for national reconciliation. Its purpose, as set forth in Resolution 955 was to

" contribute to the process of reconciliation in Rwanda" 85 Kelly Askin, a legal advisor
and consultant to the ICTR, attempts to clarify the Tribunal's mission, and notably, its
limitations:
Survivors must be advised that the primary function of most
internationalized tribunals is to bring justice to those considered most
responsible for atrocities committed during war or mass violence. It is
important that they understand that the number of accused tried will
inevitably be small in number, and that the vast majority of perpetrators
will escape trial; providing individual criminal responsibility for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide and typically involves a
long, slow, and expensive process; securing evidence and arresting
indictees is often exceedingly difficult ... 86
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Proponents of the ICTR argue that, despite its limitations, the Tribunal
has much to contribute. For example, a formal assignment of individual guilt
alleviates the sense of "collective guilt" felt by societies whose leaders carry out
aggressions. 87 In addition, tribunals deter further violence, detain the persons
most responsible and signal to the victims that the international community is
"willing to invest a significant amount of time, money, and effort to redress ...
crimes committed against them. " 88 With a greater understanding of the ICTR,
and its limitations, one can compare the Tribunal's progress with that of
alternative systems.

VI.

THE ALTERNATIVES
Less traditional systems than the ICTR have grown out of the need for

national healing and social reconstruction in Rwanda. For example, the
Rwandese Ministry of Justice has been conducting domestic trials since January,
1997 89 and a more localized system called the gacaca has been instituted. The
attributes and limitations of these systems are discussed below.
a. The Rwandese Courts - Progress and Criticism
In August 1996, Rwanda's National Assembly approved the Organic Law
on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of

supra note 1, at 56.

87
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89
MAGNARELLA, supra note 1, at 80. The genocide had devastated what structural or other
resources Rwanda once had. The Rwandese ministry of justice was located in a building
without telephones or windows. Rudimentary materials, such as paper and typewriters, were
unavailable as most government buildings had been pillaged. Of the 162 judges who once
presided, only a few were left and there were almost no trained lawyers.
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Genocide or Crimes against Humanity. 90 The Organic Law provides for
jurisdiction over all offenses committed between 1990 and 1994, the possibility
of capital punishment and leniency for confessions. 91 Under the Organic Law,
R wandese courts have tried over one thousand detainees and issued over one
hundred death sentences by 1999. 92 Twenty-two executions (by firing squad),
carried out in April 1998, 93 were followed by more than two thousand
confessions in 3 months 94 and notably, a wave of criticism from international
human rights activists. Certain scholars have boldly taken a stand against these
critics, encouraging them to "stop dictating norms and moralizing. " 95 The point
being, the survivors of genocide should be able to determine, in accordance with
their own cultural norms, what retributive measures are best suited to facilitate
their nation's reconciliation. In any event, death sentences from R wandese
courts have diminished. The percentage of accused receiving the death penalty
has fallen from 45% in 1997 to 16% in 1998 to 8% in 2000. 96
Due process, or lack thereof, in Rwandese courts has been criticized.
During 1997, very few convicted defendants had access to legal counsel because
reportedly, no lawyer could be found to represent them. 97 Since January 1997,
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the Avocats sans Frontiéres (Lawyers without Borders) have maintained a
contingent of defense attorneys in Rwanda 98 and several human rights
organizations are training those willing to provide legal representation for either
victims or defendants. 99 The quality and availability of representation for
defendants in Rwandese courts, however, will inevitably not be as consistent as
what is available to defendants indicted by the ICTR.
Although the procedural due process norms of the Rwandese Ministry of
Justice might be substandard when juxtaposed to those of the ICTR, domestic
procedure is somewhat protected by its sovereign roots. The ICTR, however, is
under an international spotlight and must commit itself not only to the
international norms of due process but also whatever supplemental measures are
needed (e.g. , an Outreach Program) to advance its impact.
Domestic courts have also been criticized for their unwillingness to
provide those persons who are acquitted and released with reintegration
assistance. In December 1998 and March 1999, the Rwandese League for the
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (PSAG) conducted a study of persons
released from Rwandese prisons to assess their reintegration progress. 100 The
PSAG discovered that former prisoners frequently endured violent detentions and
homecomings only to discover that their homes had been looted and former
employers were unwilling to rehire them. 101
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Procedural criticisms aside, the fact remains that 74.1 % of Rwandese feel
that the domestic trials are making a significant or very significant contribution
to reconciliation within their country. 102 This belief might emanate from the
proximity and accessibility of Rwandese courts or the number of defendants
convicted. Whatever its origin, the benefit of its reconciliatory impact should be
weighed against the collateral risks of wrongful prosecution and disproportional
sentencing. Regardless of the outcome, Rwandese might feel that these risks are
worth the impact that domestic trials are having on reconciliation.
b. Restorative Justice
Reconciliatory processes that emphasize victim healing, offender
accountability, reparation of losses, forgiveness and reintegration have come to
be known as "restorative justice." 103 This brand of justice is not new; it was
used by the ancient Asian, Arab, Greek, Roman and African civilizations. 104 The
approach was modeled for the first time in modern justice systems in 1974, and
since then, more than 300 programs have evolved in North America and 500 in
Europe.
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broad variety of situations, from juvenile justice programs to national truth and
reconciliation commissions. 106

i.

South Africa

In March, 2003, South Africa's TRC completed its seven-year
investigation into crimes committed during apartheid. 107 Apartheid was a system
based on racial oppression that was implemented by South Africa's National
Party (NP) government in 1948. 108 The apartheid movement perpetuated acts of
manipulation, coercion and violence until 1990 when South Africa's president
F. W. De Kl erk announced the systematic dismantling of apartheid and the
institution of a transitional government. 109 Although the political transition took
place almost over night, the social transition was hindered by South Africans
who resented decades of institutionalized inequality. These people demanded
more consideration. In response, a South African TRC was established under the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 110 to help Rwandese
reconcile past wrongs and facilitate national unity.
The Commission was structured into three committees, including the
Human Rights Violation (HRV) Committee, Amnesty Committee and Reparation
and Rehabilitation (R&R) Committee. The HRV Committee heard public
testimony and determined victim status, a designation that qualified individuals
106

Naude, supra note 104, at 3.

107

Young, supra note 103, ,rs.

108

Id . at iii,

109

Id

,r 1.

110

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, The Republic of South Africa, Act No. 34 of
1995, as am. by the Promotion of national Unity and Reconciliation Amendment Act No. 84 of 1995
[hereinafter the Act ] .

21

for government reparations. 111 The Amnesty Committee was responsible for
granting amnesty for specific acts in exchange for a truthful account of their
commission. 112 The R&R Committee was responsible for making
recommendations for reparations and victim rehabilitation. 113 Reparations took
the form of individual grants; symbolic gestures such as monuments, memorial
days, and the establishment of museums; rehabilitation, including psychological
and physical care; and empowerment initiatives, including resettlement, skills
training, and educational assistance. 114
Through its committees, the Commission held hearings and solicited
testimonials to incorporate into a chronological compilation of apartheid-related
events. 115 This accounting allowed victims the opportunity to know exactly who
they were being asked to forgive and for what magnitude of offense. This record
was the "truth" that was intended to lead to reconciliation.
While the South African TRC has been praised and emulated for its work,
Reverend Desmond Tutu, 116 its former chair, acknowledges that for South Africa,
a restorative approach was the only alternative. 117 Rev. Tutu believes that if
white politicians in Rwanda had no opportunity for amnesty through admission,
111
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but only punishment through prosecution, social unrest and violent reprisals
would have ensued. 118 Moreover, a TRC was the more fiscally sound alternative
for a nation that had been economically strained by apartheid-induced
boycotts. 119
Supporters of the South African TRC argue that a restorative justice
system is ideal for countries in transition, like South Africa and Rwanda, where
historical abuses were "perpetrated, supported, and maintained systemically,"
involving most, if not all, of the population. 120 Under these circumstances, the
moral restoration of a community requires the involvement of all of its members,
including the victims and perpetrators, as well as the supporters and silent
observers. 121 It provides a means through which they can assuage their own guilt
for actions or inactions that might not qualify as punishable offenses. In this
respect, restorative models, such as the South African TRC, provide a platform
for collective accountability that retributive systems do not. 122
What is particularly attractive about the South African TRC is its
commitment to an understanding of the social and institutional foundations for
past violence. An entire chapter of the TRC's 1998 multi-volume report is
dedicated to a greater understanding of the motives and perspectives of
perpetrators during Apartheid. 123 The Commission has made an effort to
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understand the psychology of politically and racially motivated killings and in
doing so, it has incorporated prevention into restoration. Without a thorough
understanding of the precursors to gross violations of human rights,
reconciliatory systems are alleviating the pain, but are unequipped to ameliorate
the problem.
Despite its international acclaim, the TRC has received considerable
criticism. For example, the TRC has been called the "Total Revenge
Commission" by those who see it only as a means through which to "rip open old
wounds that should be left to heal." 124 Also, retributivists argue that restorative
justice is not 'just justice' without punishment and inadequate to the task of
reconciliation. 125
Clearer criticisms include the allegation that a TRC cannot sufficiently
protect victims who are susceptible to repeat attacks. 126 The credibility of this
criticism would seem to depend on the political environment. In the case of
South Africa, the apartheid system had been dismantled and the political
transition had been peacefully negotiated. Therefore, it is doubtful that
offenders from previous system of government would wage an offensive attack
on their victims. Rwanda, on the other hand, was not a peaceful transition, and
many of the genocide's orchestrators had sought refuge in neighboring countries
where counter-offensives could be built. In that case, the extradition and
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detainment of offenders might have been more essential for the protection of
victims.
Another criticism of the South African TRC is that it procedurally
segregated victims from perpetrators. 127 The HRV Committee interacts with
victims and the Amnesty Committee deals with perpetrators. 128 The subject of
reparations is never broached in front of perpetrators during amnesty hearings
and no provision is made at that time for dialogue between the two parties. 129

°

Moreover, reparations originate from the state, not from the perpetrator. 13 For
these reasons, the South African TRC might leave victims wanting for more
restoration directly from an accused
In retrospect, South Africa's "restorative" approach might have been more
suitable to the needs of R wandese, and thus, reconciliation. In 1997, a
delegation of Rwandese visited South Africa in inquiry of the policies and
operations of the TRC. 131 The delegation ultimately decided that a TRC in
Rwanda would be an "inappropriate" and "unacceptable" model of justice to
survivors of the Rwandese genocide. 132 The 2002 Berkley survey, 133 however,
does not support this conclusion. Survey administrators reported that
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respondents placed greater importance on admissions, requests for forgiveness,
and reparations, whether material or symbolic, than retribution. 134
The South African TRC, like the ICTR, is not a flawless model and should
not be considered a blanket solution for reconciliation within all communities. It
does, however, remedy certain inadequacies of retributive justice within Rwanda.
For example, the TRC model provides victim reparations rather than the more
intangible alternative of punishment. In addition, the process is more
participatory, allowing community members a greater opportunity to influence
who will be held accountable and under what facts. Control of the process itself,
however, was still highly centralized.
C.

Gacaca : Rwandese "Lawn Justice"- 135

A new form of decentralized justice has evolved within Rwanda known as
the gacaca. It was formally initiated by the Rwandese government in 2001 to
expedite the genocide trials of lower-level accused. 136 The process draws upon a
customary system of community dispute resolution used to resolve differences
between families and individual community members. 137 The modern process,
however, is distinct from the traditional system in that its operation and
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sentencing options are governed by national legislation. 138 Since its application
in the trials of genocide detainees, the gacaca has been "wildly popular" 139 with
Rwandese who have been only mildly favorable of the national trials, and even
less enamored with the ICTR. A large majority of Rwandese feel that it is their
"greatest hope" for reconciliation. 140
The gacaca process is a hybrid of both the retributive and restorative
models, providing for punishment in lieu of or in addition to reparations. Like
the South African TRC, the gacaca places considerable emphasis on admission
and forgiveness, but also allows for imprisonment up to a duration of life. 141 The
guilty may reduce their prison sentence by as much as fifty percent through
participation in community service projects or tasks specific to the needs of a
victim or a victim's family. 142 By allowing those convicted to carry out their
sentence within the affected community, the gacaca has masterfully incorporated
reintegration into reparation. This is an attribute that the ICTR, domestic courts
and South Africa's TRC do not possess.
Like the TRC, the gacaca empowers victims and communities by allowing
their direct participation, but to an even greater degree. During a gacaca
session, the community gathers to assess the loss of life and material damage
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caused by an individual perpetrator. 143 Community members have an
opportunity to listen to and provide testimony in the presence of the accused
concerning specific offenses committed within their community. 144 Those who
sit in judgment over their neighbors consist of locally elected "people of
integrity." 145 Unlike the South African TRC, there is no procedural partition by
way of "committees" to segregate victim testimony from confession and
reparation or sentencing. In this respect, the gacaca is a more transparent and
all-inclusive process. In effect, the gacaca hands over implementation of the
process to victimized communities.
The gacaca , unfortunately, has been criticized for being even more devoid
of due process considerations than domestic trials. For example, Amnesty
International has reported that, in observed instances, defendants are given no
opportunity to speak on their own behalf, cross examine adverse witnesses or
solicit testimony from family members. 146 To the contrary, defense witnesses are
cross examined aggressively in a manner that implies involvement in the accused
crime. 147 Also, no oaths are taken and hearsay testimony is permissible. 148
If accurate, these aspects of the gacaca violate the Rwandese Code of
Criminal Procedure, including a requirement for confidentiality in judicial
investigations, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof requiring
143
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evidence to substantiate guilt. 149 Moreover, Article 14(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Rwanda is a signatory,
requires that "all persons shall be equal before courts and tribunals." 150 Within
this mandate is the understanding that each party in a criminal proceeding must
be afforded reasonable opportunity to present their case. 151 The gacaca,
assuming that the forgoing allegations are true, does not provided that
opportunity. These due process deviations leave a "wildly popular" process,
with a considerable potential to further reconciliation, open to serious
international criticism.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The success of any one pathway towards reconciliation appears to be
dependent upon the nature of political transition, breadth of accountability, and
willingness of government to support localized processes. In some cases, these
factors might call for the simultaneous operation of multiple systems.
In isolation, international tribunals like the ICTR are unlikely to reconcile
a divided nation due to their limited focus and tendency to be disconnected from
the general population. Tribunals, however, might increase their role through
greater coordination with and sensitivity to local needs. Under circumstances
where a peaceful government transition would not be advanced by formal
punishment and imprisonment is not necessary for the restoration of moral order,
a restorative model such as the South African TRC stands a good chance at
149
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furthering reconciliation. The separation of victims from perpetrators within that
process, however, might limit its potential impact.
The ICTR, domestic courts, and the gacaca are acting in concert to
facilitate reconciliation within Rwanda. In this respect, each system is not a
different path to the same end, but separate lanes on the same road, and if one
disappears, progress will slow. The ICTR's authority under the U.N. Charter is
needed to obtain the extradition of suspects. Domestic trials are necessary to
maintain a sovereign presence and some form of centralized control over
reconciliation. The gacaca is imperative to expediting trials and the smooth
reintegration of the thousands of lower-level accused.
Unfortunately, the more localized and informal the process, the fewer due
process protections are utilized. If these shortcomings offend the Rwandese,
then the process should be modified. Considering the gacaca’s domestic
approval rating, however, it is likely that the driving force behind due process
concerns originates from outside Rwanda. If that is the case, and the goal of
reconciliation must be achieved within Rwanda and between Rwandese , the
international community might consider restraining their criticisms, gaining
some cultural relativity, and giving Rwanda some room to run. Subtle and
gradual encouragement towards compliance with due process norms might prove
more effective in the long run and will avoid the risk of upsetting what looks to
be a remarkably promising multilane road to reconciliation.
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